Trade of permits for greenhouse gas emissions; bilateral trade need not be the answer by Burguet, Roberto et al.
Trade of Permits for Greenhouse Gas Emissions;
Bilateral Trade Need not Be the Answer
Roberto Burguet
Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC)
Jaume Sempere
El Colegio de Me´xico
This draft: May 2007
Abstract
The Kyoto Protocol sets national quotas on CO2 emissions and allows
international trade of these quotas. We argue that this trade is character-
ized by asymmetric, identity-dependent externalities, and show that bilateral
trade may not be sufficient for an efficient allocation of emissions. We derive
conditions under which bilateral trade does improve the allocation of per-
mits. The conditions are strong. In this sense, we argue that, for emissions
permits, market design matters.
J.E.L. Classification Numbers: D62, F18,
Keywords: Terms of trade, asymmetric externalities, permits trade
Mailing address: Institute for Economic Analysis
Campus UAB; 08193-Bellaterra; Barcelona (Spain)
e-mail: roberto.burguet@iae.csic.es; jsempe@colmex.mx
Acknowledgements: We thank Dragan Filipovich and Marcelo Soto for
helpful comments. Burguet acknowledges financial support of the Spanish
Ministry of Education and Science, grant SEC2002-02506.
1 Introduction
In 1997, at the Climate Change Summit in Kyoto, 39 countries agreed to
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions during the five year period 2008-2012.
The agreement prescribed binding targets for each country while allowing
international trade of these quotas. Given the location-independent effects
of emissions, the possibility of trade has been welcomed as a key feature
of the agreement which will guarantee that the Kyoto goals are attained at
minimum cost.
Implicit in this optimism is the assumption that “market forces”, if free
to act, will induce cost efficiency. If the initial allocation of quotas does not
minimize the cost of emissions, countries will gain from trading (part of their)
quotas. Thus, the possibility of trade means that, for efficiency purposes,
the initial allocation of quotas does not matter.1 The experience with the
1990 U.S. Acid Rain Program reinforces this view. Within this program, SO2
emission permits were initially allocated in proportion to historical emissions,
but permits were tradable. According to most assessments, indeed bilateral
trade was successful in leading to an efficient allocation of emissions. 2
In a recent paper, Copeland and Taylor (2005) have argued that there
is an important difference between permit trade in a closed economy (e.g.,
the U.S. SO2 experience) and permit trade in an open, international setting
(e.g., CO2 permit trade): In the latter, trade in permits has terms-of-trade
effects. That is, when a country trades in emission permits, and so varies its
1Distributional effects are obviously recognized.
2See, for instance, Schmalensee et al., 1998, or Joskow et al. (1998).
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emissions quota, it changes its supply of commodities to the world market
and this can affect international prices.3
In this paper, we build on this insight and note that these effects consti-
tute an externality that trading parties impose on third countries. Moreover,
terms-of-trade effects depend on the identity of the trading parties and affect
different countries differently, depending on their respective position in inter-
national commodities markets. Thus, terms-of-trade externalities associated
to trade in emissions permits are asymmetric and identity dependent.
There is a literature on auction and mechanism design that looks at the
consequences of this type of externalities. (See, for instance, Jehiel and
Moldovanu (1996), (1999), and (2000), or Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti
(1996).) One of the key lessons of this literature is that under asymmet-
ric, identity-dependent, external effects the willingness to pay for a good
(emission quota or permit) can be computed only in equilibrium. Therefore,
a simple reference to price taking behavior will not confer an unambiguous
meaning to the concept of competitive price. Efficiency becomes then a more
difficult target.
These lessons apply directly to the model of Copeland and Taylor once we
abandon their assumption that traders in the market for permits are small
3One consequence is that some economies may end up worse-off after trading in permits
despite production efficiency gains. Copeland and Taylor even show cases in which both
parties exchanging quotas could be made worse off by this trade. Also, based on the
results on the equivalence between trade in goods and trade in factors, they conclude
that, for some economies, free trade in goods will make the rule for allocating initial
quotas irrelevant for efficiency.
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firms. That is what we do in this paper. We assume that governments (that
is, large players) can determine permit trade. Thus, we analyze a model
where a country’s acquisition (and usage) of additional permits affects its
domestic welfare as well as the welfare of all other countries. We show that
in general bilateral trade will not guarantee that the allocation of permits
will move towards efficiency.
We think that the assumption that governments will determine the trade
of permits is justified for the case of CO2 emissions that motivates this paper.
Indeed, the Kyoto agreement assigns quotas to countries and allows, but does
not organize, trade. For instance, there are no provision against governments’
regulations that may effectively determine the pattern of permit trade of local
firms. And more importantly, the agreement does not attempt to organize a
(firm level, globally open) market for permits (along the lines of the European
Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme, for instance).4
We characterize efficient allocations of permits, and identify conditions
on the initial allocation of permits that guarantee that incentives to trade
are aligned with efficiency. These conditions are restrictive. In particular,
they require that no country is completely specialized in producing clean
commodities. Therefore, efficiency is too demanding a target for completely
unregulated bilateral trade of emission permits. Our conclusion is that mar-
ket design for permit trade, and not just bilateral trade, is needed in order
4Governments in the EU can still affect trade of permits, through their decisions on
the amount of permits allocated to their firms, and on what sectors are regulated through
permits and what sectors are regulated using other instruments. Thus, the market would
have to specify what are the potential users of the permits.
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to guarantee efficient allocation of emission rights.
In the next section, we present the model and discuss the externalities
generated by bilateral trade in permits via terms-of-trade effects. Then,
in Section 3, we show how bilateral trade does not necessarily improve the
allocation of permits. We give conditions that guarantee that efficiency of
bilateral trade. Section 4 puts these conditions in terms of patterns of output
and commodity trade across countries. These two sections contain our main
results, most of which are proved in the appendix. Some concluding remarks
close the paper.
2 The model
Following Copeland and Taylor (2005), we model international trade and the
environment in a Heckscher-Ohlin setup.5 There are n countries in a two
good, two factor world. Trade in commodities is assumed to be free among all
countries. We denote output of each of the goods by X and Y respectively.
The two factors are human capital, h, and pollution, z. Different countries
have different endowments of human capital, which is inelastically supplied.
Thus, we treat pollution as an input (as well as a global externality) and also
model differences in human capital endowments as the only fundamental
difference across countries.
A quota on pollution is fixed for each country by an international agree-
ment. Denote by zj the quota on pollution fixed to country j. All coun-
5We present a sketch of the model. For a full treatment and motivation, see Copeland
and Taylor (2005).
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tries are constrained by the international agreement, so global emissions,
Z =
P
j zj, and their direct effect on the utility of consumers are exoge-
nously fixed.6 Without loss of generality, we assume that h1/z1 > h2/z2 >
... > hn/zn. We will study countries’ incentives to increase their quota by
purchasing (part of) other country’s quota.
We assume the same technology for all countries, represented by
Xj = f(hxj , z
x
j )
and
Yj = g(h
y
j , z
y
j ),
where hTj and z
T
j are human capital and pollution allocated to industry T =
X,Y located in country j = 1, 2, ..., n.
Both f and g are assumed to be strictly concave, and characterized by
constant returns to scale. They are increasing in both arguments. Assume
that X is more pollution intensive than Y . So, from now on, we call X
the dirty commodity. Also assume that Y is the numeraire commodity and
denote the international price of X by p.
With our assumptions, the profit maximizing behavior of price-taking
firms can be summarized by the maximization of national income.7 That is,
6Copeland and Taylor (2005) assume that some countries may not be constrained, and
study the incentives of these countries to reduce emissions that derive from the trade of
permits.
7See, for instance, Dixit and Norman (1980), or Wong (1995), pp.40–50 for a recent
text-book discusion.
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firms’ behavior in each country j can be obtained as the solution to
Max{hx
j
,hy
j
,zx
j
,zy
j
} pXj + Yj
s.t. Xj = f(hxj , z
x
j ), Yj = g(h
y
j , z
y
j ),
zj = zxj + z
y
j , hj = h
x
j + h
y
j .
Let Gj(p, hj, zj) be the maximum of the above program, which then repre-
sents the national income function. Following Copeland and Taylor, we make
the implicit assumption that the targeted level of pollution inside a country
is attained efficiently.
The demand side is given by a representative consumer in each country
j with utility function
Uj = U(xj, yj),
where xj and yj are, respectively, consumption of the dirty and clean com-
modities by the representative consumer of country j. We assume that U
is (the same for all countries and) homothetic, strictly increasing in its ar-
guments, and strictly quasi-concave8. We also assume that both goods are
essential in consumption.
Given homotheticity of preferences (and given that Z is assumed to be
constant), the indirect utility of the representative consumer in country j
can be written as Vj = Ij/Φ(p) where, Ij is national income in j (which in
equilibrium will coincide with Gj), and Φ(p) is the true price index for the
8Again, the utility may depend on Z. However, given our assumption that global
pollution Z is exogenously fixed by an agreement, we may disregard this environmental
externality.
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private goods9. Finally, denote the net imports of X by country j by mj.
Welfare of a country j is given by the indirect utility of its representative
consumer. Then we can compute the gross change in country j’s welfare
induced by an increase in its quota as
vj ≡ dVj/dzj =
1
Φ(p)2
[Φ(p)(
∂Gj
∂zj
+
∂Gj
∂p
∂p
∂zj
)−Gj
∂Φ(p)
∂p
∂p
∂zj
].
Now, ∂Gj∂p = Xj (see, for instance Wong, 1995, p. 44), and applying Roy’s
identity (and noticing that 1Φ(p) is the marginal utility of income), we have
that
1
Φ(p)2
[−Gj
∂Φ(p)
∂p
] = − 1
Φ(p)
xj,
where the left hand side is the derivative of the indirect utility function
with respect to price, taking income as given, and the right hand side is the
negative of demand times the marginal utility of income. Thus, we have10
vj = dVj/dzj =
1
Φ(p)
(
∂Gj
∂zj
−mj
∂p
∂zj
). (1)
As equation (1) shows, vj can be decomposed in a direct effect on welfare,
due to the increase in inputs, and an indirect effect, due to the effect on
international terms-of-trade.11
9For instance, if preferences are represented by a Cobb-Douglas U(x, y) = xay1−a with
income M then the indirect utility function is V = Ma−a(1−a)a−1pa . So Φ(p) = a
−a(1 −
a)a−1pa.
10We should also include the effect on international prices of the change in demand
associated to any transfer of income from buyer to seller. However, given our assumptions
on utility functions, this change in total demand in international markets is absent.
11Notice that this expresion coincides with (23) in Copeland and Taylor (2005), partic-
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One could be tempted to argue that vj represents the willingness to pay
of country j for a (marginal) increase in its emissions quota. That would
be certainly the case if all countries were small, and then all price effects
∂p
∂zj
= 0. Then, free market forces should lead to trade in permits where the
country that is willing to pay the highest price vj =
∂Gj
∂zj
buys emissions rights
from other countries. However, when countries are not small, the change in
quota of country j has effects on other countries as well. Indeed, if country j
acquires an additional unit of emission permits, this country will change its
output and therefore will change the international terms-of-trade. Indeed,
this increase in country j’s quota will have an effect on country l’s welfare,
l 6= j, given by
−el(j) ≡ dVl/dzj =
1
Φ(p)
(−ml
∂p
∂zj
) (2)
Notice that this indirect effect may be asymmetric across countries since it
depends on the net imports of the dirty commodity of the country involved.
It is also identity-dependent because it may depend on the identity of the
country acquiring the pollution rights. Again, if countries took international
prices as given, then all price effects would disappear: el(j) = 0.
Before we proceed with the analysis of the consequences of trade for
efficiency, notice that, if we define ej(j) ≡ 1Φ(p)(−mj
∂p
∂zj
), then
X
l
el(j) =
1
Φ(p)
∂p
∂zj
X
l
ml = 0,
since the sum of the net imports is always zero. Also, the following remarks,
that we do not need to prove, will be useful later on:
ularized to the case where Z is constant and we do not take into account the possible price
paid for the permit.
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Remark 1: If country j is completely specialized in commodity Y (X),
then country l is also specialized in that commodity for all l (>) < j.
Remark 2: If country j’s imports of commodity X are positive (nega-
tive), then country l’s imports are also positive (negative) for all l (>) < j.
3 Bilateral Trade and Efficiency
We now turn to analyzing the relationship between efficiency and the in-
centives to trade emission permits. If an allocation of permits is (globally)
efficient, then a marginal redistribution of permits between any two coun-
tries must have a net zero effect on global welfare. Note that ej(i) is the
effect of an increase in country i’s permits on country j’s welfare. Thus, the
effect of a (marginal) increase in the permits of country i on total welfare is
vi −
P
j 6=i ej(i) =
∂Gi
∂zi
. Thus, a condition for an (interior) efficient allocation
of quotas is that ∂Gi∂zi is the same for all countries. In fact, given our convexity
assumptions, this is a sufficient condition for efficiency.
Since preferences are identical and homothetic, and technologies are also
identical and homogeneous, if country j is not specialized in any of the com-
modities then ∂Gj∂zj =
∂g(1,
z
y
j
h
y
j
)
∂z = P
∂f(1,
zx
j
hx
j
)
∂z . Thus, if no country is completely
specialized and, by the Factor-Price Equalization Theorem, all countries use
the same ratio z
i
hi , for i = x, y, then the allocation of permits is efficient.
Moreover, bilateral trade will not take place, since ∂p∂zj , and then vj, is also
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the same for all countries.12
That bilateral trade do not destabilize efficient allocations of permits
is reassuring. Nevertheless, the real question is whether bilateral trade is
enough to guarantee that efficiency will be attained starting from a non
efficient position. Or put in less ambitious terms,13 if some of them are
specialized in the production of one on the commodities, will countries have
incentives to trade towards more efficient allocations of permits?
To illustrate the answers that we will give to this question, consider the
following example:
Example: There are three countries with Cobb-Douglas preferences
and technologies:
U(xj, yj) = xjyj,
and
Xj =
³
hxj
´ 1
3
³
zxj
´ 2
3 , Yj =
³
hyj
´ 2
3
³
zyj
´ 1
3 .
Let the initial allocation be (z1, h1) = (.6, 3), (z2, h2) = (1, 2), and (z3, h3) =
(1.5, 1). With these values, country 1 specializes in the clean commodity
Y , and country 3 specializes in the dirty commodity X, whereas country 2
12In this case, Copeland and Taylor argue that any rule for asigning emission permits
is efficient.
13Indeed, political economy constraints may limit the amount of permits each one coun-
try can consider trading. Also, we are considering “emissions” as an input. In reality,
what is an input is not the emissions per se, but other goods used in production that are
associated to emissions. If some of these are not tradable, then emissions permits may
be only partially tradable. However, all we need for the analysis below is that ”some”
permits are tradable.
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produces both commodities, but exports the dirty commodity.14
We can compute φv and φe and obtain φv = (.88, .85, .67), and φe1(2) =
−.24, φe1(3) = −.07, φe2(1) = −.005, φe2(3) = .005, φe3(1) = −.09, and
φe3(2) = .23. With these values, φ
h
vi −
P
j 6=i ej(i)
i
is 1.02, .86, and .745
respectively for i = 1, 2, and 3. Thus, any trade where country 1 sells
permits is a trade away from efficiency. Also, any trade where country 2
sells to country 3. However, notice that country 1 would be willing to sell
permits to country 2 at any price above v1 + e1(2) = .64/φ, and country 2
would be willing to pay up to v2 + e2(1) = .84/φ to get the permit from
country 1. Thus, bilateral trade may take the allocation even further away
from efficiency (and impose a welfare loss).
This is not the only possible trade at mutual advantage in this example.
In fact, country 3 is willing to sell permits to country 1 at a price that country
1 is willing to accept, and this trade is efficient. Also, country 2 is willing to
sell to country 3 at a price that country 3 is willing to accept, and this trade
is also inefficient. What trade would take place is a question that would need
a richer model to answer, but what the example illustrate is that bilateral
trade alone does not guarantee that the efficient trade will take place.
The example also illustrates the consequences of external effects associ-
ated to bilateral trade. Indeed, when countries 1 and 2 trade, they do not
consider that this trade has a net, negative effect on country 3. Indeed,
3’s exports are large, and the transfer of permits from country 1 to country
14With these values, p=1.27. Country 1 uses a ratio of z to h of .2 in the production
of Y , and country 3 uses a ratio 3/2 in the production of X, whereas country 2 uses, of
course, a ratio between these two number in the production of each commodity.
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3 implies a drastic reduction of the price of exports: country 1, which is
specialized in clean commodities, reduces its production of clean goods and
country 2 increases its production of the dirty commodities, and reduces its
own production of the clean commodity (Rybczynski theorem). The terms-
of-trade effects of such permits exchange on country 3 are represented by the
difference between e3(2) and e3(1), which means a worsening of size .32/φ on
the welfare of country 3.
Is the example above exotic in any sense? In other words, what conditions
guarantee that inefficient trades will not occur? We now aim at answering
this question.
For a given allocation of permits, let I∗ be the set of all solutions to
i∗ = argmax
i


vi −
X
j 6=i
ej(i)


 = argmaxi
∂Gi
∂zi
.
Any trade where i∗ ∈ I∗ sells permits to a country j /∈ I∗ is an inefficient
trade. A first step towards answering our question is given by the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 The gains from a bilateral trade of permits from some i∗ ∈ I∗
are non positive if X
l 6=i∗,j
el(i∗) ≥
X
l 6=i∗,j
el(j)
for all j 6= i∗. Also, if this condition is satisfied, there exists a price at which
country j, j /∈ I∗, sells to country i∗ at mutual advantage.
Proof: As in the example, a necessary condition for a trade of quota from
country i∗ to country j is that vj + ej(i∗) > vi∗ + ei∗(j). Indeed, the left
12
hand side is the willingness to pay of country j for this bilateral trade, and
the right hand side is the minimum ask price for country i∗. Now, from the
definition of I∗, vi∗ −
P
l 6=i∗ el(i∗) > vj −
P
l 6=j el(j) for all j /∈ I∗. Thus, ifP
l 6=i∗,j el(i∗) ≥
P
l 6=i∗,j el(j), summing up these two inequalities we get
vi∗ − ej(i∗) > vj − ei∗(j),
and this proves the first part of the lemma. The proof of the second part
follows the same line. QED.
The interpretation of Lemma 1 is intuitive. Countries i∗ and j will trade
without considering the externalities their trade imposes on third countries.
That is, the private incentive for trade is equal to the social incentive (the
total welfare effects) minus the externalities on third parties. Therefore,
when the social incentive and the (negative of) the externalities on third
countries are aligned, the private incentive and the social one have the same
sign. Thus, trade would be impossible if all the social gains from trade had
already been exhausted. Moreover, if social gains from trade had not been
exhausted, a trade towards the efficient allocation would also improve the
private plight of the parties. We also put this lemma in terms international
trade. Recalling that
X
l
el(j) = 0,
Corollary: No inefficient bilateral trade involving sale of permits by i∗ ∈
I∗ can be at mutual advantage if, for all j 6= i∗,
(mi∗ +mj)
Ã
∂p
∂zi∗
− ∂p
∂zj
!
≤ 0.
Also, if this condition is satisfied, there exists a price at which country j,
j /∈ I∗, sells to country i∗ at mutual advantage.
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4 Trade, Specialization, and the Efficiency of
Trade
Lemma 1 and its corollary show conditions that guarantee some sort of “sta-
bility” of the efficient solution. These conditions are set in terms of net trades
and the impact of permits on international prices. The latter may be difficult
to observe. In this section we relate the conditions in the previous section
with the structure of output of the different countries.
From now on, let us denote by bi the country with lowest rate z/h (the
country most intensive in h) among the ones that are not specialized 15. Thus,
all countries j < bi will produce only the clean commodity Y . Moreover, all
countries specialized in Y will import commodity X, so thatmj > 0 for these
countries.
Under constant returns to scale, the productivity of an input in the pro-
duction of one good depends (inversely) on the ratio of that input to the
other(s) in that production. When a country is completely specialized in
one commodity, this ratio is simply the ratio of the endowments. With little
more than this observation, we can show that
Lemma 2: 1 ∈ I∗. If bi 6= 1, then I∗ = {1}. If bi = 1, then I∗coincides
with the set of countries that are not specialized in production.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 is intuitive. If two countries are producing the same good, it
is efficient to assign additional permits to the one that is doing so with the
15There may be extreme cases where all countries are specialized. This is a simple case
that follows the same line of analysis.
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greatest ratio of h to z. For the case of commodity X one of these countries
is bi. But for country bi the slope of the production possibilities frontier is
equal to the price. Then, it is almost immediate that countries that face
scarcity (relative to the market transformation rate) of the input z should be
the ones that are assigned any extra amount of such input. Thus, efficiency
requires that this input is assigned to country 1 if this country is completely
specialized in Y , or else to some country that produces both commodities.
The signs of price effects and their relative sizes are also, and for similar
reasons, well behaved:
Lemma 3: ∂p∂zj >
∂p
∂zj0
> 0 for all j < j0 < bi. Also, if country j > bi is
completely specialized in commodity X, then ∂p∂zbi < ∂p∂zj0 < 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Notice that the effect on the price ofX of an increase in emissions permits
of country bi is negative, from Rybczynsky’s theorem. A simple corollary of
this theorem is that this effect is the same for all countries that produce
both goods. In fact, the largest, negative effect on the price is obtained
by assigning new emission permits to any of these countries. Lemma 3 is
(partly) a consequence of the fact that, under our assumptions on preferences
and technologies, consumers in each country spend the same proportion of
their income in each of the commodities. Then, each country j < bi spends
the same proportion of their income in imports (of the dirty commodity),
and each country j that is completely specialized in X exports the same
proportion of their outcome.
We are now ready to answer our question: what does it take for the
conditions of Lemma 1 to be satisfied? The answer is our proposition 1:
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Proposition 1: For i∗ ∈ I∗, (mi∗ +mj)
³
∂p
∂zi∗
− ∂p∂zj
´
≤ 0 for all j 6= i∗ if
and only if bi = 1. That is, if and only if country 1 produces both commodities.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The next proposition analyzes conditions such that the gains from trade
are not only positive when trade is efficient, but are also maximized by such
trade.
Proposition 2: Assume that for i∗ ∈ I∗, (mi∗ +mj)
³
∂p
∂zi∗
− ∂p∂zj
´
≤ 0 for
all j 6= i∗ (and then bi = 1). For any j /∈ I∗ the gain from trading emission
permits with i∗ is positive and larger that the gain from trading with any other
country not in I∗.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 establishes necessary conditions for Lemma 1 to apply, so
that efficient trades of permits are feasible and no trade involving selling
permits by their most efficient user is feasible. Yet, as in our example, other
permit trades between countries not in I∗ may be feasible even under the
conditions of Proposition 1. We do not know whether those trades would be
efficient or not. Would a country sell permits to another not in I∗, instead of
selling to a country in I∗? Again, we would need a full fledged model of how
countries find partners, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
Proposition 2 suggest that reasonable such models would predict the right
trade under the conditions of Lemma 1.
Summarizing our results, only when the country with the highest relative
endowment of h is not too intensive in h and/or is sufficiently large so as
to not specialize in any commodity it is possible to guarantee that bilateral
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trade would lead initial allocations toward more efficient ones. Notice that
these conditions are strong. Thus, the initial allocation of rights is likely to
influence the final efficiency of the allocation of emissions.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that free market forces, understood as the unregulated,
decentralized ability of governments to trade, is not a sufficient condition for
an efficient allocation of carbon-dioxide emission quotas. The corollary is
that market design, and not just market forces, may be a key ingredient to
attain this efficiency goal.
The main feature of permits trade that explains this result is the pres-
ence of identity-dependent, asymmetric, external effects. Different countries
may have different preferences about who obtains additional permits, if they
themselves do not.
There are three assumptions that confer full fledge to our results. The
first one is openness of the international commodities market. The second is
that the parties trading in the permit market are not “small”. Indeed, if they
were, even though the aggregate profile of permits would affect an individual
country, one can still assume that no individual country can modify it. The
third is that parties are not “small” in the commodities market either. If
they were, international prices in these markets would not be affected by
changes in production of an individual country, and therefore externalities
(effects on terms-of-trade) would not be an issue.
In the above analysis we have assumed that countries buy permits only
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to use them, and do not trade for purely speculative reasons.16 Also, the re-
sults were obtained under several simplifying assumptions (two commodities,
symmetry in preferences and technologies,...). However, we think that the
arguments made are sufficiently grounded on economic arguments to sup-
port the idea that bilateral trade is not a good substitute for the design of a
market for permits.
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7 Appendix
Lemma 2: 1 ∈ I∗. If bi 6= 1, then I∗ = {1}. If bi = 1, then I∗coincides with
the set of countries that are not specialized in production.
Proof: All countries i = 1, ...,bi − 1 specialize in commodity Y . That is,
Gj(p, hj, zj) = g(hj , zj). Thus,
∂Gj
∂zj
=
∂g(1, zjhj )
∂z
, ∀j < bi,
Since g exhibits decreasing returns in each of its inputs, and hjzj >
hj0
zj0
for
j < j0, this excludes 2, ...,bi − 1 ∈ I∗. Similarly, we show hjzj ≤ hxbizxbi for all
j that specialize in commodity X. That is, country bi produces commodity
X using h more intensively than country j. Indeed, since bi produces both
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commodities,
P ·
∂f(
hxbi
zxbi , 1)
∂h
=
∂g(
hybi
zybi , 1)
∂h
.
Thus, if hjzj >
hxbi
zxbi , then
P ·
∂f(hjzj , 1)
∂h
<
∂g(
hxbi
zxbi , 1)
∂h
,
so that country j would increase its national income by switching an infini-
tesimal amount of inputs from the production of X to the production of Y
in the proportion
hybi
zybi .
Now, applying the envelope theorem,
∂Gbi
∂zbi = P · ∂f(h
xbi ,zxbi )
∂z > P · ∂f(hj ,zj)∂z =
∂Gj
∂zj
. This excludes i∗ > bi and specialized in production of X. We need
only excluding 1 < bi ∈ I∗. Notice that bi ∈ I∗ implies that hybizybi >
hbi−1
zbi−1 ,
since ∂Gj∂zj =
∂g(1,
z
y
j
h
y
j
)
∂zj
for j ≤ bi, and ∂2g∂z2 < 0. On the other hand, since
hbi−1
zbi−1 > hbizbi it is immediate that h
xbi
zxbi <
hbi−1
zbi−1 (< h
ybi
zybi ). Also, notice that countrybi−1 could always switch a small amount of inputs z and h in the proportion
hxbi
zxbi , without reducing the ratio
hybi
zybi . Then, since P ·
∂f(
hxbi
zxbi ,1)
∂z =
∂g(
h
ybi
z
ybi ,1)
∂z >
∂g(
hbi−1
zbi−1 ,1)
∂z , country
bi−1’s income would increase, which contradicts one of the
equilibrium conditions. Lemma 2 follows.
The last part of the Lemma follows from the observation just proved that
∂Gbi
∂zbi > ∂Gj∂zj , for j > bi and specialized in production of X, together with the
fact (from the factor price equalization theorem) that ∂Gi∂zi =
∂Gh
∂zh
for all j, h
that are not completely specialized in production. QED.
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Lemma 3: ∂p∂zj >
∂p
∂zj0
> 0 for all j < j0 < bi. Also, if country j > bi is
completely specialized in commodity X, then ∂p∂zbi < ∂p∂zj0 < 0.
Proof: Consider the market clearing condition
nX
l=1
ml = 0.
Totally differentiating in this equilibrium condition, we obtain
∂p
∂zj
= −∂
Pn
l=1ml/∂zj
∂
Pn
l=1ml/∂p
.
Now, since U is homothetic and increasing, quasi-concave and in all its ar-
guments, the domestic demand of commodity X is
xj(P,Gj) = α(P )
Gj
P
,
where α(P ) ∈ (0, 1). Also, country j0s output of commodity X is f(hj, zj) =
Gi
P if j is specialized in commodity X, and 0 if j <
bi. Thus,
mj = xj−Xj =



α(P )GiP = α(P )
g(hj ,zj)
P if j <
bi
α(P )GiP −
Gi
P = f(hj , zj) (α(P )− 1) if j specialized in X
Notice that
∂
Pn
l=1
ml
∂p < 0. Also,
∂
Pn
l=1
ml
∂zj
= ∂mj∂zj . Homogeneity of degree 1
of both g and f , and decreasing returns in each of the inputs again allow
us to conclude that ∂p∂zj >
∂p
∂zj0
> 0 for all j < j0 < bi and ∂p∂zj < ∂p∂zj0 < 0
for all countries j < j0 completely specialized in commodity X. Thus, the
only thing that is left to analyze is
∂mbi
∂zbi . For that purpose, we first show
hj
zj
≤
hxbi
zxbi when j is completely specialized in commodity X. That is, countrybi produces commodity X using h more intensively than country j. Indeed,
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since bi produces both commodities, and partial derivatives of the production
function are homogeneous of degree 0,
P ·
∂f(
hxbi
zxbi , 1)
∂h
=
∂g(
hybi
zybi , 1)
∂h
.
Thus, if hjzj >
hxbi
zxbi , then
P ·
∂f(hjzj , 1)
∂h
<
∂g(
hybi
zybi , 1)
∂h
,
so that country j would increase its national income by switching an infini-
tesimal amount of inputs from the production of X to the production of Y
in the proportion
hybi
zybi .
But , applying the envelope theorem,
∂Gbi
∂zbi = P · ∂f(h
xbi ,zxbi )
∂z > P · ∂f(hj ,zj)∂z =
∂Gj
∂zj
. Thus, mj = f(hj, zj) (α(P )− 1), and mbi = GjP α(P ) − f(hxbi , zxbi ) =
f(hxbi , zxbi ) (α(P )− 1) + α(P )P g(hybi , zybi ). Also, ∂g(h
ybi (z),zybi (z))
∂z < 0, from Rybczyn-
ski’s Theorem (where hybi (z) and zybi (z) are quantities of inputs used in the
production of y, as function of the total endowment of z of country bi). Thus,
∂f(hxbi (z),zxbi (z))
∂z >
∂f(hxbi ,zxbi )
∂z (country
bi would not be maximizing national income
otherwise), and since α(P ) − 1 < 0, ∂mbi∂zbi < ∂f(h
xbi ,zxbi )
∂z (α(P ) − 1) <
∂mj
∂zj
< 0.
QED
Proposition 1: For i∗ ∈ I∗, (mi∗ +mj)
³
∂p
∂zi∗
− ∂p∂zj
´
≤ 0 for all j 6= i∗ if
and only if bi = 1. That is, if and only if country 1 produces both commodities.
Proof: First we proof the only if part. Assume that bi > 1. If bi > 2, then
m1 +m2 > 0 and
∂p
∂z1
− ∂p∂z2 > 0 as well. Thus, we need consider only
bi = 2.
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If m2 > 0, again m1 + m2 > 0 and
∂p
∂z1
− ∂p∂z2 > 0. If m2 < 0, then for all
j > 2, we have that mj < 0 as well, from our remark 2. Thus, only country
1 imports. Thus, we still have m1 +m2 > 0,
∂p
∂zi∗
− ∂p∂z2 > 0.
Now we turn to the if part. Notice that if i∗ = 1, is the only country that
is not specialized in the production of a single commodity, then country 1 is
the only country that produces commodity Y (the only country that imports
X) so that mi∗ + mj > 0 for all j. Also,
∂p
∂zi∗
< ∂p∂zj < 0 for all j. Thus,
(mi∗ +mj)
³
∂p
∂zi∗
− ∂p∂zj
´
≤ 0. QED.
Proposition 2: Assume that for i∗ ∈ I∗, (mi∗ +mj)
³
∂p
∂zi∗
− ∂p∂zj
´
≤ 0 for
all j 6= i∗ (and then bi = 1). For any j /∈ I∗ the gain from trading quota with
i∗ is positive and larger that the gain from trading with any other country not
in I∗.
Proof: We need to show that, under the assumptions of Lemma 1, v i∗ +
e i∗(j)− [vj + ej( i∗)] > vl + el(j)− [ vj + ej(l)] for all j, l /∈ I∗. Notice that,
if the assumption of Lemma 1 is satisfied, v i∗ + e i∗(j) > vl + el(j). Thus,
we need only showing that ej(l) > ej( i∗). That is, mj(
∂p
∂zl
− ∂p∂z i∗ ) > 0.
This follows from the assumption that bi = 1, which implies that all j /∈ I∗is
specialized in the production of the dirty commodity so that mj < 0. QED.
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